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Introduction 
On one widely held view, the common law is a body of rules laid down by 
courts. The ratio or holding of a case is the rule laid down by the court in 
that case. In adjudication, courts apply rules laid down in previous cases, or 
if no rule previously laid down is applicable and there is a ‘gap in the law’, 
they make new law by devising a new rule to apply. There is clearly some 
truth in this picture, but it is nevertheless problematic, as various writers 
have argued. It does not appear to account very satisfactorily for the 
character of common law legal reasoning, including the conventional idea 
that it involves reasoning by analogy, and it implies that, at least in some 
circumstances – where there is a gap in the law – a court adjudicates by 
making law in a free exercise of moral judgement, unconstrained by 
authority, and that when it does so it legislates retroactively. 
There is another, older conception of the common law, the ‘classical 
theory’ or ‘declaratory theory’ of the common law. This is more difficult to 
characterise, though one can say at least that it represents the courts as 
always applying existing law, and not legislating retroactively, even in the 
absence of a rule previously laid down, so that the law cannot simply be 
equated with a body of rules laid down in previous decisions. Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory of interpretation is a modern account of the common law 
in this tradition, and an important part of the appeal of Dworkin’s theory is 
that it also appears to be more successful in explaining the actual character 
of legal reasoning in the common law. 
For proponents of the body of rules theory of the common law, any 
supposed shortcomings of the theory pale into insignificance in the light of 
the fact that it appears to follow directly from the nature of a legal system, 
understood as a system for providing authoritative guidance to its subjects 
about how they should act. The most comprehensive and celebrated version 
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of this argument is Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’ theory of authority 
and the ‘sources thesis’ that he derives from it, which equate the law with a 
body of ‘exclusionary rules’ devised and laid down by legal authorities. I 
shall adopt this, in general, as the body of rules theory, and refer to it as the 
exclusionary rules analysis of the common law. From this standpoint, the 
objection to any version of the classical or declaratory theory is that it 
appears to lack a sound basis in a theory of authority. More particularly, it is 
not apparent how it can be that the common law arises from the 
authoritative character of the case law, and yet is not to be equated with a 
body of rules laid down in previous cases.  
In this article I offer an account of authority in the common law that I 
argue is consistent with the service conception of authority, but amounts to 
a version of the classical or declaratory theory rather than the body of rules 
theory of the common law. I begin with an outline of the service conception 
and the exclusionary rules analysis of the law. Then I discuss the problems 
that this approach faces in explaining the common law. I then go on to 
consider analogical reasoning, and this leads to a discussion, in the final 
section, of a version of Dworkin’s theory of the common law. 
I.  The law as a moral authority  
The service conception and the law as a body of 
rules 
According to Raz, a moral authority A has authority over a subject S with 
respect to some matter when, by following A’s directives rather than relying 
on his own judgment, S is more likely to do as he ought to do in the 
circumstances. This is the ‘service conception’ of authority, because a 
directive provides a service to the subject by assisting him to act as he ought 
to. If S ought to follow A’s directives because this is the case, A is a 
legitimate authority.1 
In the absence of an authoritative directive, S should act on the 
balance of reasons or considerations applicable in the circumstances. A 
legitimate authority identifies these reasons and in the light of them issues a 
directive to S, which, if followed by S, will lead him to conform more 
reliably to the reasons that apply to him than he could by applying his own 
judgement. In this way, the authority ‘mediates’ between S and the reasons 
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that apply directly to him.2 Raz refers to these ‘first order’, directly 
applicable reasons as ‘dependent’ reasons. The ‘dependency thesis’ holds 
that the directives of a legitimate authority are based on dependent reasons.3 
If an authority is legitimate, S ought to accept the authority’s 
assessment of the dependent reasons as definitive. He should follow the 
directive rather than acting according to his own assessment of the 
dependent reasons. Thus the authority’s directive generates an 
‘exclusionary reason’, a reason to disregard the first order, dependent 
reasons. These reasons are ‘excluded’ or ‘pre-empted’ – this is the ‘pre-
emption thesis’ – and replaced by a new reason for action, a reason to 
follow the directive instead.4 It follows that, if the directive is to serve its 
purpose, it must be possible for S to establish what it requires of him 
without considering the dependent reasons that lie behind it, that is to say, 
without exercising moral judgement.5 
The ‘normal justification thesis’ (NJT) gives the standard reason why 
an authority can be legitimate.6 S ought to follow the directive because the 
authority A is more capable than S of determining what S should do, that is 
to say, more capable of determining what the dependent reasons are and 
how S should act in accordance with them. The NJT is satisfied where the 
authority has superior expertise on empirical or moral questions, by virtue 
of which it can determine how S should act when S may not be able to. It is 
also satisfied where, as a result of its being a ‘de facto authority’ – generally 
recognised as an authority – A is in a position to secure co-ordination by 
stipulating a convention, because its directives will generally be followed. 
For example, if there is no convention about which side of the road to drive, 
A can stipulate a convention that all cars should drive on the left. In 
practice, these two bases for authority are likely to arise in combination in 
what I shall refer to as a new regulatory regime, which creates quite new 
relationships and responsibilities relating to a certain sphere of activity.7 
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The law as a body of ‘exclusionary rules’ 
According to Raz, the law claims to be or purports to be a moral authority.8 
Although it may fail to be a legitimate moral authority, legal institutions 
and the character of legal reasoning can be understood only on the 
assumption that, at least by its own lights, the law acts as a moral authority. 
The law – in the form of a court or legislature – acts as a moral authority by 
issuing general directives in the form of rules. A rule gives a general 
description of conduct that S is required to follow – it applies to a category 
or range of conduct rather than a particular action, such as might be 
required by a command directed at S personally on a particular occasion. In 
laying down a rule, the legal authority assesses the dependent reasons that 
would apply in the absence of a rule. In accordance with the pre-emption 
thesis, by issuing the rule the authority generates a new reason, a reason to 
follow the rule, that replaces and excludes consideration of any of the 
dependent reasons that would otherwise apply. It is the defining feature of 
rules that they are ‘exclusionary’ in this sense. I shall generally understand 
rules in this way and refer to ‘exclusionary rules’ meaning rules understood 
in this way. From the standpoint of someone who accepts the law’s claim to 
legitimacy, S should simply follow legal rules.9 
The exclusionary rules analysis leads to certain important 
conclusions about the nature of law. First, on this approach, the law’s main 
function is to provide guidance by laying down rules. It provides guidance 
because it consists of rules that govern a category of conduct and can be 
followed without the need for moral judgment.10 Secondly, because the 
function of the law is to replace moral considerations with rules whose 
content is a matter of fact – a description of the conduct required – it makes 
sense to equate the law with these rules and their factual content: this is 
Raz’s version of the famous ‘sources thesis’, that ‘all law is source-based’, 
or, more fully, the test for identifying the content of the law does not 
involve moral judgement or argument.11 Also, on this approach, a legal rule 
is made by an authority acting to that end, that is to say by the exercise of a 
normative power to make the rule.12 Furthermore, it appears to follow that 
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the content of a legal rule is the expression of the intention of the authority 
in making it.13  
Although the sources thesis holds that the exercise of moral 
judgement is not involved in determining what the law is, in Raz’s version 
this is not based on scepticism about the truth of propositions of morality or 
the possibility of exercising moral judgement soundly. To the contrary, the 
service conception presupposes that it makes sense to speak of an authority 
that can exercise its judgement to identify reasons and weigh them up to 
establish how a subject ought to behave, and it implies that if an authority is 
legitimate, a subject can incur a moral duty to follow rules that the authority 
lays down. The service conception is not a sociological concept of 
authority, concerned only with whether and in what way an authority 
exercises influence over its subjects.14 
II. The exclusionary rules analysis and the 
common law 
The common law 
On this general analysis, the common law consists of exclusionary rules laid 
down by the courts in the adjudication of disputes. In adjudication, the main 
function of the court is to identify and apply the law, which means rules 
previously laid down. If the facts do not fall under any such rule15 – i.e., 
there is a gap in the law – the court exercises its moral judgement to 
determine a new rule to lay down, which it then applies to the facts of the 
case to dispose of it, thereby filling the gap, or part of it. Here the court has 
a legal duty to reason morally and to formulate the best rule for the 
circumstances, just as a legislature should, and it does this as part of the 
legal process, but it does not apply pre-existing law.16 In addition, a court 
may be empowered to overrule previous decisions, at least in some limited 
circumstances, in effect creating a gap that it then fills by laying down a 
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new rule.17 Again this involves the exercise of moral judgement by the 
court.  
The character of legal reasoning in the common 
law 
As suggested above, one problematic feature of this account of the common 
law concerns the character of common law reasoning. The recognised 
features of common law reasoning discussed below do not seem to be 
consistent with, or at least are not easily or naturally reconcilable with, the 
exclusionary rules analysis.18 
On the exclusionary rules analysis, legal reasoning in the courts has a 
binary or dichotomous character. Where an issue is governed by a rule laid 
down by a previous directive, the issue is a matter of law, determined by 
authority, and here the court declares the existing law. Where an issue arises 
that does not fall under any such rule, the issue is not governed by authority 
and is not a matter of law; here there is a gap in the law, and the issue is 
dealt with by moral reasoning and judgment to formulate a new rule to 
apply. The exclusionary rules analysis implies that there will always be 
gaps because circumstances will always arise for which no rule has been 
laid down. It is doubtful whether this picture is reflected in the case law. 
Sometimes a court initially sets out an account of settled law before 
considering an issue on which the law is unsettled or unclear. This might 
suggest that there are two distinct stages in reasoning, concerned first with 
determining what the existing law is in accordance with authority, and then 
with determining how to make new law where there is a gap. It might be 
argued that the appearance of unsettled or unclear law rather than simply a 
gap might arise from the fact that, in the absence of law, although the courts 
are not subject to the authority of pre-existing case law, they should take 
account of the value of predictability in the law and so make law by analogy 
with previous cases.19 This use of analogical reasoning would disguise the 
sharp difference between the law and a gap in the law. But it seems 
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Authority in the Common Law 
 
7
doubtful whether it is actually possible, even by very close examination, to 
distinguish between statements of existing law and statements of new law, 
and furthermore the courts always purport to declare or find the law in the 
sense that, in the end, they always apply it to the facts of the case without 
making any distinction between what was already law and what is new.20  
More generally, on the exclusionary rules analysis one would expect 
a court to go to great lengths to produce a clear and explicit statement of the 
rule that it applies or lays down, just as if it were a statutory provision (and 
one might even expect a formal process for promulgating the new rule). Of 
course, this may be very difficult to achieve in practice, and it is 
understandable that a court will often fall short; but in fact one does not get 
the impression from the case law that laying down a rule as a guide is even 
the court’s principal aim. It might seem more accurate to say that the court’s 
principal aim is to reach a just resolution of the dispute according to law, 
and that the guidance it provides is to be inferred from this. Furthermore, on 
the exclusionary rules analysis, the rule laid down by the court is to be 
equated with the ratio decidendi or holding of the case,21 but it is far from 
clear that when a court does pronounce an explicit rule as the basis for its 
decision this rule is necessarily the ratio of the case; there is great 
controversy over the proper way to understand the ratio of a case, which is 
difficult to reconcile with this straightforward conception of the ratio. 
Another difficulty concerns the courts’ power to overrule previous 
decisions. It is understandable that a court should have a power to overrule 
previous decisions, but since the court’s first function in adjudication is to 
apply existing law, at least where there is law, it seems clear that a court 
should first apply the rule previously laid down, and then change the law for 
the future – it should separate the application of pre-existing law from 
legislation.22 But the courts do not make purely prospective changes to the 
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law. When a court overrules a decision, it abrogates the rule laid down, and 
this takes effect retroactively, since the court then formulates a new rule 
that applies to the present case and to future cases involving events that 
have already occurred. This failure to give effect to rules previously laid 
down is at odds with the guidance function of the law under the 
exclusionary rules analysis. 
The same difficulty arises in connection with the standard common 
law technique of distinguishing. As it is ordinarily understood, 
distinguishing a previous case means modifying the rule laid down in that 
case by limiting it so that it does not apply to the facts of the case now in 
issue. It appears that a court can distinguish a previous case whenever it 
considers that the facts of the new case differ materially from the facts of 
the previous case, though it can modify the rule laid down only in a way 
that leaves it consistent with the outcome in the previous case.23 Again it 
would seem that, in accordance with the guidance function, the court should 
first apply the existing law and then separately alter it for the future.  
Distinguishing, understood in this way, seems to be inconsistent with 
the exclusionary rules analysis for a further reason. Under the exclusionary 
rules analysis, a decision can be authoritative only if it takes the form of an 
exclusionary rule. A rule defines a category of cases, within which a later 
case can fall and so be governed by the rule, which can thus be applied 
without the exercise of moral judgement. But a court can always avoid the 
application of a rule declared in an earlier case by distinguishing it, by 
identifying a material difference between the new case and the earlier one, 
in the exercise of its moral judgement. What is binding, it appears, is not the 
rule declared in the earlier case, but the decision itself – the outcome on its 
facts – as understood by the later court, in the sense that it is binding if the 
later court cannot identify a material difference between the new case and 
the earlier one. On this understanding the court argues by analogy from the 
previous case, following it when the new case is ‘relevantly similar’ and 
distinguishing it when it is not. It treats the rule declared as merely 
provisional, adopting it or qualifying or extending it as it considers 
appropriate. If this is how the effect of a decision for later courts should be 
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understood, it seems that a decision is not authoritative under the service 
conception, because it is the later court’s moral judgement that really 
determines its decision, not the earlier case, and it seems that the earlier 
case provides no genuine guidance at all.24 On this view, rather than playing 
a role in gap-filling to supplement the exclusionary rules analysis, making 
new law more predictable, analogical reasoning seems to be subversive of 
the exclusionary rules analysis.  
Distinguishing is an aspect of a more general practice in legal 
reasoning, according to which a court decides a case by adopting a rule that 
it considers is consistent with the decisions on the facts in a body of 
previous cases, whether or not the rule was previously laid down. Such a 
rule is taken to give effect to the existing law and to respect the binding 
authority of previous cases, though it was not laid down in any previous 
case. It seems that in this way the courts can develop and change the rules 
of the common law not by rejecting previous decisions but by reinterpreting 
them. Again, this is inconsistent with the exclusionary rules analysis, 
according to which the law consists of exclusionary rules laid down by 
courts in previous decisions.  
Thus the exclusionary rules analysis is difficult to reconcile with the 
recognised character of common law legal reasoning. Indeed the appeal of 
the exclusionary rules analysis surely lies far more in the fact that it appears 
to follow from the nature and function of legal rules, and more broadly from 
Raz’s general theory of authority, than in its ability to explain common law 
reasoning as it is conventionally understood. On the strength of the 
exclusionary rules analysis, one might conclude that common law legal 
reasoning suffers from various pervasive forms of fallacious argument. The 
courts should only overrule prospectively; they should renounce the 
practice of distinguishing as it is normally understood, and also the practice 
of reasoning by analogy from previous decisions on their facts, and by the 
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10                                   (2011) 36 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
 
construction of rules consistent with previous decisions on their facts, 
which seem to give rules a provisional character; they should abandon the 
pretence that they always declare the existing law; they should learn to 
differentiate clearly in their judgements between applying existing law in 
accordance with authority, and making new law by the exercise of moral 
judgement free of authority; and they should learn to express new rules in 
such a way as to make them clear and identifiable as such. But these 
supposed fallacies are time-honoured and apparently fundamental features 
of the common law, and one is bound to ask whether another account of 
authority and legal reasoning in the common law is available that can 
explain the common law as it stands.25 
Gaps and judicial legislation 
The objection discussed above was that the exclusionary rules analysis does 
not appear to be consistent with the actual pattern of legal reasoning in the 
common law. It also appears that common law reasoning understood in 
accordance with the exclusionary rules analysis is open to objection on 
grounds of political morality. The conventional assumption is that the 
courts’ function is only to apply existing law and not to make new law. 
Making new law involves the exercise of moral or political judgement, and 
this, it is said, is properly the preserve of a democratically-accountable 
legislature. But, according to the exclusionary rules analysis, where there is 
a gap in the law a court makes new law free of any constraint by authority. 
Here it seems that the court is free in principle to act in the same way as a 
legislature, though it is not democratically accountable in the same way.26  
It is indisputable that in the common law the judges do make law. 
The law changes over time as a result of their decisions, and this is surely 
inevitable: there must sometimes be cases involving new situations that 
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cannot be resolved by the application of rules previously laid down,27 and 
judges make new law as they resolve them. Furthermore, judges must be 
able to overrule poor decisions, unless all remedial work on the common 
law is left to the legislature. It seems inevitable that judges should on some 
occasions be free to decide cases purely on the basis of their own moral 
judgement unconstrained by authority, as the exclusionary rules theory 
holds, whatever political objections there might be to such an arrangement, 
and the impression that courts give that they always decide according to the 
existing law seems to be just a fiction that hides this fact. 
The question is whether there might be an alternative analysis of 
authority in the common law that explains how it can be that, although 
judges do make law, they are at the same time in some sense governed by 
authority, and not free of it like a legislature. This might explain why it is 
always said that the law ‘develops’ or ‘evolves’, implying, it would seem, 
that in making new law the courts draw on and are constrained by the 
existing case law. This would go some way to meeting the objection to 
judicial legislation, though it will seem paradoxical in the light of the 
exclusionary rules analysis, according to which on any issue a court must 
either be free to exercise moral judgement or be bound by authority.28  
Doing justice in adjudication 
Doing justice as between the parties to a dispute entails holding the 
defendant accountable to the claimant according to the moral requirements 
that applied as between the parties in the circumstances in which they 
acted.29 On the exclusionary rules analysis, this means (on the assumption 
that the law’s claim to moral authority is justified) that justice is done when 
rules previously laid down are applied in adjudication. The defendant’s 
liability is assessed by reference to the authoritative guidance that governed 
the parties at the time. 
This means, first, that overruling and distinguishing are liable to 
involve injustice, because, as pointed out above, they retroactively disapply 
rules previously laid down, which the parties were entitled to rely on as 
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330-35.  
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  See generally Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Distinction between Adjudication and 
Legislation’, in A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siècle) (1997).  
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from a breach of duty: see further Peter Jaffey, Private Law and Property 
Claims (2007) 20-29. 
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authoritative guidance. Secondly, a problem arises where there is a gap in 
the law, where no rule has been laid down. Here, to do justice between the 
parties, the court should in principle decide the matter according to the 
moral reasons or considerations that were applicable to the parties in the 
absence of a rule. On the exclusionary rules analysis, the court should 
legislate, devising a rule and then applying it to the facts to dispose of the 
case. Clearly, in this situation one cannot say that the defendant is held 
liable on the basis that he failed to conform to authoritative guidance. 
Nevertheless, it seems that it would not be unjust to hold him liable 
according to the rule laid down, if the duty arising by virtue of the rule 
corresponds to the duty that subsisted in the absence of the rule on the 
balance of moral considerations. But if there is no such correspondence, the 
court has imposed a new duty retroactively.30  
It might appear that, since the moral considerations that should be 
applied are the dependent reasons underlying the rule, there is no difference 
between the requirements of the rule and the moral requirements in its 
absence, and so no possibility of injustice. However, as Raz points out, the 
law is liable to make a difference to the pre-existing moral position. He 
rejects what he describes as the ‘no-difference thesis’:31 the law may well 
impose a duty that does not simply replicate a pre-existing moral duty. This 
is surely a crucial function of the law. In particular, first, sometimes a new 
convention is required to overcome a problem of social co-ordination – for 
example, a convention that everyone should drive on the left.32 If, in the 
absence of a convention, the authority pronounces that henceforth everyone 
should drive on the left, it imposes a duty to drive on the left that did not 
exist before. Before this, one might say there was an abstract duty to follow 
whatever convention may become established, but there was certainly no 
concrete duty actually to drive on the left. If such a rule is adopted and 
applied in adjudication, the parties are treated on the basis that they ought to 
have followed a convention that was not then in effect. Secondly, an 
                                                          
30
  On the problem of retroactive legislation, see TRS, 84. 
31
  See MF, 30, 48. It is not necessary for present purposes to discuss the 
literature on the ‘practical difference thesis’ which concerns inclusive and 
exclusive positivism: see e.g. Shapiro, above n 5. 
32
  More broadly, Raz refers to other types of case where the court has to make 
an arbitrary choice between possible options, though not in order to establish 
a convention, and to ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ cases: MF, 48-9. An authority’s 
pronouncement may be authoritative though mistaken, so the law could also 
make a difference by misstating the pre-existing moral duty. Raz argues that 
the law turns simple reasons for actions or ‘oughts’ into duties: MF, 60. This 
follows from Raz’s view that, strictly speaking, a duty arises only by virtue 
of an exclusionary rule, and not on the balance of reasons. It reflects the fact 
that the law makes a difference, rather than constituting a different way in 
which it makes a difference.  
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authority may lay down a rule in the light of knowledge of the effects of the 
subject’s actions in the circumstances that the authority possesses but an 
ordinary subject of the law does not. The ordinary subject’s moral duty in 
the absence of the new rule or set of rules reflects his own more limited 
knowledge, and for this reason also it might be unjust to enforce the new 
rules against him.33 Often, as suggested above, a new convention and 
specialist knowledge are combined in a new regulatory regime. For these 
reasons, a court that is free to lay down rules that it considers are 
prospectively the best rules for the situation at hand, in accordance with the 
dependency thesis, is liable to cause injustice if it applies them in 
adjudication to resolve cases. (If this were not the case there would be no 
need to be concerned about the effective promulgation of new legal rules).  
A possible response to this objection is to argue that it is not unjust to 
a defendant for a court to legislate where there is a gap and enforce the new 
rule against him, provided this does not frustrate expectations engendered in 
the defendant by the law (this is the problem with respect to overruling and 
distinguishing), and where there is a gap in the law this requirement will be 
met because there have been no authoritative directives to engender any 
expectations.34 But, with respect to gap-filling, the concern here is not with 
injustice arising from the fact that the defendant had expectations 
engendered by the law, but with injustice arising from the fact that a new 
rule can impose a duty that was not there before.35 Another view is that, 
where there is a gap in the law, the defendant can have no reasonable 
objection if the process by which the court makes new law to fill the gap 
meets appropriate standards for law-making, according to the principle of 
legality or the rule of law, which requires in particular that the court should 
not have acted arbitrarily.36 But the court might lay down a new rule 
according to impeccable standards of law-making (apart from the objection 
of retroactivity) that it would nevertheless be unfair to enforce against the 
                                                          
33
  Some would object to this formulation and say that the subject’s knowledge 
is relevant not to whether he has a duty but to whether or to what extent he 
can be held responsible for a breach, but this objection does not affect the 
substance of the argument. The point does not presuppose that the 
defendant’s duty depends on actual knowledge of particular consequences, 
for example harm to others, as opposed to knowledge of circumstances 
affecting the risk to others. 
34
  AL, 198; Facing Up, 1210. 
35
  For example, Raz says, Facing Up, 1210, ‘… even when it is impractical to 
be guided by [the Hand test for negligence] before the accident, people 
should accept it as the basis for settlement of damages after the harm 
occurred’.  
36
  Timothy Endicott, ‘Adjudication and the Law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 311. See also John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ 
(2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199 212, 217. 
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defendant, because he did not at this time have a moral duty to act in the 
way that the new rule now requires.37 
One might say, finally, that it is not the function of the courts to do 
justice in the particular case, at least where this conflicts with their 
responsibility to lay down new rules.38 A court must decide on a rule to 
apply, and it should adopt the best rule for the future even if this causes 
injustice in the particular case; injustice through retroactive legislation is 
inevitable in a system for guidance by authority. But, to the contrary, one 
would think that under the exclusionary rules analysis the courts should 
separate out adjudication and legislation, first doing justice as between the 
parties without ‘making a difference’, and then if necessary laying down a 
new rule for the future. This seems the appropriate approach, but of course 
the courts do not do this, and indeed it is widely thought that purely 
prospective legislation is in some sense contrary to the nature of the 
common law.39 Conversely, if the courts do aim to do justice on the facts as 
they purport to do, so that they do not aim to make a difference, and they do 
not separately lay down rules with prospective effect, it is difficult to see 
how the law can change over time, as it evidently does.  
Thus the question, again, is whether an alternative analysis of 
authority in the common law is available that explains the actual pattern of 
legal reasoning in the common law; and also explains how it can be that the 
courts are always subject to the authority of previous case law, even as they 
develop the law through the exercise of moral judgement; and in what sense 
a decision is authoritative if the rule declared by the court is merely 
provisional and the later court argues from the decision by analogy; and 
                                                          
37
  Raz also says that if a party knew or ought to have known that the court 
would legislate in a certain way, it is not unjust for the new rule to be 
applied retroactively against him, because he was forewarned that this 
would be the case: Raz, Facing Up, 1211. This may be the case sometimes, 
but presumably people cannot generally be expected to foresee what an 
authority will do. 
38
  According to Raz, we should not assume that it is the function of common 
law courts to dispense justice, and his theory leaves this point open: Facing 
Up, 1210.  
39
  In Kleinwort Benson (above n 19) at 379, Lord Goff says: ‘... when the 
judges state what the law is, their decisions do, in the sense I have described, 
have a retrospective effect. That is, I believe, inevitable... I must confess that 
I cannot imagine how a common law system, or indeed any legal system, 
can operate otherwise if the law is be applied equally to all and yet be 
capable of organic change... The only alternative, as I see it, is to adopt a 
system of prospective overruling. But such a system, although it has 
occasionally been adopted elsewhere ... has no place in our legal system’.  
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how the law can change through decisions that always aim to do justice as 
between the parties in the prevailing circumstances. 
III. Analogical reasoning and interpretation 
The problem of analogical reasoning 
It is often said that the standard form of legal reasoning in the common law 
is analogical reasoning,40 though its role and significance is controversial. 
The idea of analogical reasoning is that, if a new case is analogous or 
‘relevantly similar’ to a decided case, it should be decided in the same way. 
This involves comparing the facts of the two cases. It does not depend on 
applying a rule laid down in the earlier case. It may involve formulating a 
rule that is applicable on the facts of both cases, but the rule is not inferred 
from or dictated by the earlier case. The objection usually directed at 
analogical reasoning is that it is indeterminate: it cannot actually assist 
courts in making their decisions, even if this is not appreciated by the courts 
that purport to employ it. The problem is that, as anticipated above, there 
seems to be no determinate way of saying whether a case is in fact 
‘relevantly similar’ to an earlier case. Cases can be similar or dissimilar in 
innumerable ways. A later court can always find a difference between the 
current case and an earlier one in order to avoid following the earlier case, 
however many cases there have been, or treat the current case as similar in 
relevant respects if it is inclined to follow it.41  
On one view of analogical reasoning, it complements the application 
of exclusionary rules by contributing to the formulation of new rules where 
there is a gap in the law. On this approach, the court begins with the rule 
laid down in the previous case. The rule determines what the material facts 
of the case were, the facts that were relevant to the outcome. Indeed the rule 
may be expressed simply as a statement of the material facts in the case. 
Analogical reasoning involves extending the rule laid down in the decision 
into a gap in the law, by treating the facts of the new case as analogous to 
the material facts of the previous case as defined by the rule. If the rule laid 
                                                          
40
  There are many works on analogical reasoning including, for example, Raz, 
AL, ch 10; Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Rev ed, 
1994) Ch 7; Cass R Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) 
Ch 3; Lloyd L Weinreb, Legal Reason (2005); Scott Brewer, ‘Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 923; Edward H 
Levi, ‘The Nature of Judicial Reasoning’ (1965) 32 University of Chicago 
Law Review 395; Eisenberg, above n 23, 83-96.  
41
  See, for example, Schauer, above n 9, 184; Alexander, ‘Constrained by 
Precedent’ (1989) 63 Southern California Law Review 1,38. 
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down was expressed to apply to motor cars, the court might now treat 
lorries as analogous and extend the rule accordingly. The use of analogical 
reasoning to make new law in this way has the advantage that new law is 
more likely to be continuous with existing law and predictable in the light 
of it.42 
However, it seems doubtful whether analogical reasoning understood 
in this way really provides a genuine constraint on the later court’s 
decision-making. The scope of the rule originally laid down must be taken 
to reflect a judgement that within its scope the considerations that support 
the rule prevail over the considerations against it, but there is clearly no 
implication that beyond its scope the considerations that support the rule 
should continue to prevail, so as to justify extending the rule. Outside the 
scope of the rule, where there is a gap in the law, all relevant considerations 
have to be considered afresh. It seems plausible to say that, when courts 
employ or purport to employ analogical reasoning in this way, all they are 
really doing is investigating and reflecting on the facts of earlier cases and 
comparing them to the case in hand in a way that may improve their 
understanding of the moral issues and help them formulate a sound new rule 
where there is a gap in the law.43 In any case, on this understanding of 
analogical reasoning it does not provide an alternative to the exclusionary 
rules analysis that might avoid the problems identified above. 
An alternative approach to analogical reasoning 
There is an alternative approach to analogical reasoning, according to which 
it is not based on accepting the exclusionary rule laid down in the previous 
case, and the court does not begin by accepting the previous court’s 
determination of the material facts. Instead, the court compares the cases to 
see if they are equivalent according to its own determination of which facts 
are material in the two cases. This means, in particular, that, if the previous 
decision laid down a rule that applies to the facts of the new case, it is open 
to the court to modify the rule to exclude the current case if it considers that 
                                                          
42
  In invoking predictability as the rationale for analogical reasoning, Raz 
‘attempts to steer a middle course’ between those who regard analogical 
reasoning as ‘window dressing’ and those who consider it to be legally 
binding: AL 205-6. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006) (below 
‘JR’) 69.  
43
  See Alexander & Sherwin, above n 9, Ch III; Eisenberg, above n 23, 53, 86. 
Some writers say that judges simply have a faculty of intuition acquired 
through education and practical experience that enables them to discern 
relevant similarity: see eg, Weinreb, above n 40; Levi, above n 40. Although 
judges may no doubt develop skills in moral reasoning and judgement, this 
does not solve the problem of the logical relevance of the earlier case.  
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the cases are not in fact analogous. This appears to be what a court does 
when it distinguishes an earlier decision. 
This again invites the objection mentioned above, that analogical 
reasoning is indeterminate, and therefore, if rules can be modified in 
accordance with the courts’ use of analogical reasoning, that the rules of the 
common law are illusory and do not really govern later cases at all.44 But 
although analogical reasoning understood in this way cannot determine a 
later decision, it can, in a certain sense, constrain the later court. If a later 
court has to follow the earlier decision unless it is satisfied that there is a 
genuine moral basis for distinguishing between the two cases, it may be 
constrained, in the exercise of its moral judgement, to reach a decision that 
it would not have reached through an unconstrained moral judgement. The 
real objection is that there is no point in subjecting courts to such a 
constraint: a decision should either lay down an exclusionary rule, in which 
case its value as an authority depends on the fact that it can be applied in the 
ordinary case without moral judgement so as to provide effective guidance, 
or alternatively, if it does not lay down an exclusionary rule applicable to 
the new case and the later court has to exercise moral judgement to make 
the decision, it should be free to make its own best moral judgement 
without any constraint created by the previous decision. If there is no 
applicable exclusionary rule, why should the later court’s judgement be 
constrained by the need to secure consistency with an earlier decision with 
which it may disagree? One suggestion is that making decisions by analogy 
in this way is justified by the requirement that ‘like cases should be treated 
alike’, meaning that it is unfair to discriminate between parties in different 
cases whose positions are in relevant respects the same. But this seems a 
very weak argument.45 If the earlier case was wrongly decided, it would 
                                                          
44
  See the discussion of the ‘result model’ in Alexander, ‘Constrained by 
Precedent’, above n 41, Part IV. Alexander also rejects the ‘a fortiori’ 
argument for analogical reasoning. This argument is that if the later case is 
identical save for some additional fact that favours the party equivalent to 
the winner in the earlier case, the result for this party follows ‘a fortiori’; 
also, if the later case is identical to the earlier one save for the addition of a 
number of facts whose weights in favour of one party or the other can be 
added together, again the outcome of the later case follows a fortiori. The 
argument seems question-begging because it presupposes that morally-
significant facts – which must really mean the moral considerations by 
virtue of which the facts have moral significance – can be weighed up 
against each other in an uncontentious way, but it is the contentious nature 
of this exercise that makes some constraint from previous case law 
desirable. Cf John F Horty, ‘The Result Model of Precedent’ (2004) 10 
Legal Theory 19, defending a version of the a fortiori argument.  
45
  See Alexander, ‘Constrained by Precedent’, above 41, 9-13. But Moore does 
think that a principle of equal treatment can account for common law 
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surely be better to ignore it and make the right decision now. There seems 
no value in repeating a bad decision in the interests of equal treatment. 
The ‘like cases should be treated alike’ argument is based on the 
value of consistency with previous decisions, irrespective of whether they 
are correct. Similarly, the idea mentioned above, that the value of analogical 
reasoning lies in promoting continuity relative to, or predictability in the 
light of, previous decisions, does not rely on the assumption that previous 
decisions were correctly decided. But, in my view, analogical reasoning is 
better understood to be based on this assumption, that is to say that previous 
decisions were correctly decided as to the outcome on their facts. If a court 
has reason to defer to the earlier court’s judgement and accept that its 
decision was sound as to the outcome on its facts, then analogical reasoning 
can surely increase the likelihood of reaching a sound decision, even though 
the decision is not determined by the earlier decision without the need for 
moral judgement, as it would be in the case of an exclusionary rule. 
Analogical reasoning is based, in other words, on attributing to 
courts, not the authority to lay down exclusionary rules, but the authority to 
determine what outcome is just on the particular facts of the case. The first 
function of a court is to reach a decision that is just as between the parties 
on the facts of the case, and this function is reflected in the structure and 
character of litigation, including the emphasis on a detailed account of the 
particular facts and the focus of the arguments on them. This does not mean 
that the court is not required to articulate a justification for the decision and 
formulate an appropriate rule. The point is that a court’s ability to identify 
and express the rationale for a decision, or to identify precisely which facts 
are material, or to formulate a rule that also applies in situations not directly 
under consideration, falls short of its ability to reach a just decision with 
respect to the outcome on the facts. On this assumption, if the court 
formulates a rule to justify its decision, the rule should indeed be treated as 
a provisional rather than a definitive exclusionary rule, in the sense that, 
although it is of necessity applied as the definitive law in the case in hand, 
with respect to future cases it is to be understood as a rule proposed or 
offered, as it were, as the appropriate rule, but subject to modification in 
cases that a later court regards as materially different.  
One might object that one cannot distinguish between accepting the 
decision as sound on its facts and adopting the rule that the court laid down, 
because a later court has no access to any facts other than the findings of the 
original court. Of course, it is true that the later court must rely on the 
                                                                                                                                       
precedential reasoning: Michael S Moore, ‘Legal Principles Revisited’ 
(1997) 82 Iowa Law Review 867, 872. Dworkin also took this view at one 
time: TRS, 111-113. See also Duxbury, above n 23, 170-82. 
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earlier court’s judgement for its account of the facts. However, a court 
giving judgement sets out all the circumstances in detail, going well beyond 
the particular facts that it then picks out as material. There is plenty of room 
for a later court to accept the decision as sound, but adopt a different rule to 
account for it: it could recharacterise the material facts, defining a material 
fact more narrowly or more broadly, or discard a fact relied on by the 
original court, or rely on a fact regarded as immaterial by it. The common 
law style of judgement is entirely apt to enable a later court to reassess the 
basis for the decision.46 
The question, then, is the nature of the constraint arising from the 
acceptance of a previous decision as sound in this way. The decision does 
not bind a later court in the way that an exclusionary rule does, without the 
exercise of moral judgement, unless the later case is identical,47 and of 
course there is always some difference or other between the facts of two 
cases. However, the assumption of the soundness of a decision on its facts 
does create a constraint of the sort mentioned above. It arises because a 
court is not free to distinguish earlier decisions on arbitrary or artificial 
grounds, since this does not amount to genuine acceptance of them as sound 
decisions. Each decision represents, with respect to the outcome on the 
facts, a judgement of the balance of moral considerations in those 
circumstances, and, if a court accepts that the outcome on the facts was 
sound, it must either follow the decision or distinguish it on grounds that it 
considers morally defensible, that is to say by identifying some morally-
relevant feature of the present case that justifies treating it differently. The 
decision provides a constraint by restricting the morally-plausible rules that 
can be adopted consistently with it. 
The constraint arising in this way from a single decision may be 
weak and of limited use in providing guidance, certainly by comparison 
with an exclusionary rule, but many previous decisions combine to create a 
much stronger constraint. Whereas under the exclusionary rules analysis the 
law is constructed by adding together rules separately laid down in previous 
cases, on the suggested approach the court instead has to construct a body 
of rules by determining what rules are consistent with previous decisions 
taken together. Decisions have an interactive effect, in the sense that their 
material facts are mutually dependent, and so they operate holistically or 
collectively, not one by one. On this approach, one might say that the court 
reasons by way of multiple concurrent analogies, and simple analogical 
                                                          
46
  Lamond, above n 18, at 17, 23 notes this feature of judgements but has a 
different account of it: see below, n 49.  
47
  The decision is a binding authority for the parties with respect to the 
particular issues in dispute under the doctrine of res judicata, but the issue 
here is the effect of the decision on the general law.  
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reasoning from case to case is a limited and partial form of the general 
method. This general pattern of reasoning is quite different from that 
involved in reasoning from exclusionary rules. It has more in common with 
reasoning from a collection of observations or experimental findings in a 
scientific or empirical context, where they provide support for a theory that 
is used to make predictions for new circumstances.48  
Furthermore, the assumption should be that, although the courts are 
generally reasonably successful in determining a just outcome, they are not 
infallible. Thus a court should not necessarily seek to develop a body of 
rules consistent with every single previous decision; it should be free to 
adopt an account that explains most decisions convincingly but is 
inconsistent with particular decisions, in preference to an account that 
accommodates these decisions with artificial or arbitrary distinctions. In 
other words, the courts should attempt to develop a body of rules for which 
there is the strongest support in the case law through convergence and 
mutual support and corroboration, that is to say they should aim to produce 
a coherent account of the case law.49 
                                                          
48
  See Michael S Moore, ‘Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalisation’ in 
Laurence Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (Press 1987). In scientific 
reasoning, no single finding on its own dictates or fully determines a 
prediction, but each makes a contribution to providing support for the 
theory. One might say that collectively the findings provide reliable 
evidence for the prediction. A scientific theory is generally supported by 
independent and duplicated findings so that the authority of individual 
scientists becomes irrelevant, but in the analogous moral case the position is 
different in this respect. The reliability of the prediction would normally also 
be understood to depend on whether the formula has support from other 
relevant theories that are well supported by findings in other experiments or 
from other observations. Furthermore, it is possible for an experimental 
finding to be mistaken, and sometimes it may be justified to reject an 
experimental finding if it is inconsistent with a theory that is otherwise well 
supported.  
49
  Lamond, above n 18, also argues that the doctrine of precedent requires 
courts to treat previous decisions as correctly decided on their facts, but his 
approach is quite different from the one set out here. It has more in common 
with Raz’s account of distinguishing mentioned in n 24 above. According to 
Lamond, the ratio of a decision consists of certain facts identified by the 
court as together justifying the decision in all the circumstances of the case. 
The circumstances include not just these facts, but all the other facts given in 
the judgement. If a later case falls within the ratio, the later court must 
follow the precedent unless it takes the view that in some respect the facts of 
the later case are relevantly different from the facts outside the ratio of the 
earlier case, in which case it can distinguish. On Lamond’s approach, the 
facts forming the ratio are stated authoritatively by the precedent court. This 
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It seems clear that this approach corresponds more closely with the 
actual pattern of legal reasoning in the common law than the exclusionary 
rules analysis. The fundamental constraint the court is under is to conform 
to previous decisions on their facts, not to apply exclusionary rules 
previously laid down, and rules are built up by analogical reasoning on the 
basis of this constraint. Thus the rules laid down by the courts are 
provisional, in the sense explained above.50 A court can distinguish a 
previous case and modify the rule it laid down; it can extend a rule or 
subsume it into a more general rule; and it may even replace the old rule 
with an entirely different rule or body of rules that accounts for the previous 
decisions in a quite different way. The approach also provides a rationale 
for overruling: a decision should be overruled if it becomes apparent that it 
is anomalous in the sense that it does not cohere with other decisions. 
On this analysis, furthermore, legal reasoning does not have the 
binary character implicit in the exclusionary rules analysis, under which an 
issue is either governed by an exclusionary rule or, if it falls outside the 
                                                                                                                                       
means that, if the later court considers that the facts that bring the later case 
within the ratio differ from those of the earlier case, that is to say there is a 
different instance of the type of fact stipulated by the earlier court, the later 
court cannot distinguish. For example, if the earlier court considered that it 
was a fact forming part of the ratio that the defendant used a ‘weapon’, the 
later court could not distinguish on the basis that in the later case the weapon 
was a knife and not a gun, even if it thought this difference justified a 
different outcome. This seems to be contrary to the practice of 
distinguishing as ordinarily understood. It is a variant of the rule-based 
approach, inasmuch as the later court is bound to defer to the precedent 
court’s authoritative formulation of the ratio. Lamond’s approach is also 
contrary to the usual understanding in recognising, in effect, two categories 
of material fact, those within the ratio and those outside it. On the usual 
understanding, the ratio is equated with the material facts, and a court seeks 
to make an exhaustive statement of the material facts. On the approach 
suggested here, the reason why other facts may be relevant for a later court 
is that the later court is not bound to accept the earlier court’s formulation of 
the ratio as authoritative. 
50
  See also JR, 205-7, referring to ‘presumptive’ rules; Frederick Schauer, ‘Is 
the Common Law Law?’ (1989) 77 California Law Review 455  and 
Schauer, above n 9, 177; Donald H Regan, ‘Authority and Value: 
Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom’ (1989) 62 Southern California 
Law Review 995, who describes his ‘indicator rules’ as provisional; 
Eisenberg, above n 23, 65; Theodore M Benditt, ‘The Rule of Precedent’ in 
Goldstein, above n 48, 95; Levi, above n 40. Cf Perry’s concept of a 
‘summary rule’, meaning a ‘device of convenience summarising the balance 
of principles’: Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law’ 
above n 18, 225, and Stephen R Perry, ‘Two Models of Principles’ (1997) 
82 Iowa Law Review 787, 791.  
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scope of any rule previously laid down, is a matter for moral judgement. In 
other words, precedential reasoning is not distinct from analogical 
reasoning, as it is under the exclusionary rules analysis. Instead, the 
exercise of moral judgement by way of analogical reasoning is an 
inseparable part of the process by which the court is constrained by 
previous decisions. It makes sense to say that the court always declares the 
law, even when it applies a rule not previously applied, or when it overrules 
or distinguishes a rule previously applied. There are no gaps in the law, 
where the court is free of any constraint from previous decisions, as a 
legislature is when it makes law.  
One might object that provisional rules cannot actually provide 
guidance to ordinary subjects of the law. It is true that the provisional 
character of rules detracts from their effectiveness in guidance, but this 
provisional character reflects the actual position in the common law, in 
which distinguishing and overruling are established features. Furthermore, 
in a well-developed area of law, where there have been many decisions 
identifying the relevant underlying considerations, weighing them up, and 
exploring the way in which they interact and support each other, the rules 
will operate for practical purposes as if they were ordinary exclusionary 
rules.51 Indeed one would think that the way in which they have been 
developed means that the law is more likely to be sound and stable, and so 
provide good guidance, than would be the case if each decision of a court 
independently lays down an exclusionary rule that is liable to be overruled 
by a later court. 
The interpretative method 
This suggested approach amounts to a version of Dworkin’s theory of 
‘constructive interpretation’,52 and I will refer to it as the interpretative 
                                                          
51
  It seems to me that only rules that have achieved recognition through a 
series of cases come to be known as ‘the rule in X v Y’. Cf Lamond, above 
n 18, 21. 
52
  See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) (below LE) Ch 8. I 
have presented the interpretative method as a development of analogical 
reasoning. Raz describes Dworkin’s theory as an ‘extreme case of total faith 
in analogical arguments’: AL, 205-6.  Dworkin is dismissive of analogical 
reasoning for similar reasons to those given above: JR, 69. See also David 
O. Brink, ‘Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review’ (1988) 
17 Philosophy and Public Affairs 105, and ‘Legal Interpretation, 
Objectivity, and Morality’ in Brian Leiter (ed), Objectivity in Law and 
Morals (2001) esp 49-54; Eisenberg, above n 23, 154, on the ‘generative 
conception’ of the common law; Stephen R Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, 
Precedent, and the Common Law’ above n 18, 241-2, and ‘Second-Order 
Reasons, Uncertainty, and Legal Theory’ (1989)  62 Southern California 
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method of legal reasoning, although, unlike Dworkin’s general theory of 
constructive interpretation, the suggested approach is concerned only with 
legal reasoning from the decisions of courts in the common law. It might be 
thought that under the interpretative method the justification for following a 
previous decision on its facts, whether or not it is thought to be correct, is 
the intrinsic value of treating like cases alike; this argument was relied on 
by Dworkin at one time.53 As mentioned above, this is sometimes said to be 
the justification of analogical reasoning, but the argument is not convincing 
– there seems no good reason to follow the earlier decision irrespective of 
whether it is likely to be sound, purely for the sake of uniformity of 
treatment – and it is not adopted in the analysis above. The interpretative 
method proceeds on the assumption that previous decisions are generally 
likely to be correct on their facts and that taking account of them in the way 
the interpretative method requires is the best way of reaching the right 
decision in the new case. 
Similarly, one might think that the justification for the interpretative 
method is the value of coherence, and critics have argued that the 
interpretative method promotes coherence at the expense of justice, and 
have objected that a court should not follow or depart from a previous 
decision simply in order to promote coherence in the law.54 But on the 
suggested analysis coherence is not sought for its own sake, and when a 
court disregards a previous decision in the process of constructing a 
coherent body of law, this is not in order to promote coherence over justice, 
but in order to determine what justice requires, by way of the interpretative 
method.  
As Dworkin has explained, the approach draws on the ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ method of moral reasoning.55 The reflective equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                       
Law Review 913.  
53
  TRS, 111-13. See above n 45. 
54
  The argument is made by way of criticism of Dworkin’s concept of integrity 
which is offered as the basis for the interpretative method: see LE, Chs 6-7; 
JR, Ch 6. Integrity is said to be a value in political morality distinct from, 
and capable of prevailing over, justice. Critics have doubted whether 
integrity is distinct from coherence or equality: see Alexander & Kress, 
‘Against Legal Principles’ above n 25; Dale Smith, ‘The Many Faces of 
Political Integrity’ in Hershovitz (ed), Exploring Law’s Empire (2006) Ch 6; 
Raz, EPD 325; Christopher J Peters, ‘Foolish Consistency: on Equality, 
Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 2031. 
For more sympathetic accounts of integrity, see Gerald J Postema, 
‘Integrity: Justice in Workclothes’ in Justine Burley (ed), Dworkin and his 
Critics; Scott Hershovitz, ‘Integrity and Stare Decisis’ in Scott Hershovitz, 
(ed), Exploring Law’s Empire, 114-5.  
55
  See TRS Ch 6, especially 160-61; JR, 246-7; John Rawls, A Theory of 
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method seeks to harmonise intuitions or convictions concerning the moral 
position in particular circumstances – decisions on the facts in the common 
law – with the general principles taken to justify them, by exposing for 
further reflection convictions or principles that appear anomalous. It relies 
on the assumption that each concrete conviction or decision is a reasonably 
reliable but not infallible guide to the balance of moral considerations 
applicable in those circumstances and that moral considerations and their 
relative weight should be understood consistently across the law.56 
Coherence is valuable not for its own sake, but because it is relevant to the 
construction of a just body of rules on the basis of these assumptions.57 
IV. Authority and justice under the interpretative 
method 
The interpretative method and authority 
According to the exclusionary rules analysis, the ratio decidendi or holding 
of a case is simply the rule laid down by the court to decide the case in the 
exercise of a legislative power. The ratio is fixed and identifying it is a 
matter of construing the rule, which means establishing the intention of the 
                                                                                                                                       
Justice (1972) 48-51; Perry, ‘Two Models of Principles’ above n 50, 813; 
Brewer, above n 40, 938-9.  
56
  In the common law the interpretative method seeks harmony across the 
decisions of different judges, not the convictions of an individual. For 
objections to the argument for analogical reasoning based on the analogy 
with reflective equilibrium, see Larry Alexander ‘Bad Beginnings’ (1996) 
145 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 57 and ‘The Banality of Legal 
Reasoning’ (1998) 73 Notre Dame Law Review 517. Raz points out that 
promoting coherence through the reflective equilibrium method does not 
eliminate systemic bias or ignorance: Joseph Raz, ‘The Relevance of 
Coherence’ (1992) 72 Boston University Law Review 273, 280. See also 
Barbara Baum Levenbook, ‘The Meaning of Precedent’ (2000) 6 Legal 
Theory 185, 233-38.  
57
  More generally, some writers take the view that, if a court is to do justice, it 
must be altogether free to apply its judgement to determine and apply the 
applicable moral principles, free of any constraint by precedent. See M 
Moore, ‘Authority, Law and Razian Reasons’ (1989) 62 Southern California 
Law Review 827, 867, 872-3; Heidi M Hurd, ‘Challenging Authority’ (1991) 
100 Yale Law Journal 1611, 1614-41; Alexander, ‘Constrained by 
Precedent’ above 41, 16. These writers were considering the exclusionary 
rules analysis not the interpretative method. There is surely no reason to 
think that complete freedom for judges to exercise their moral judgement, 
free of any constraint from previous decisions, is likely to be the best way to 
ensure that courts make just decisions.  
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court that laid it down.58 Although the ratio of a decision is a rule that may 
operate in conjunction with another rule or set of rules, it is nevertheless 
fundamentally an independent rule to be construed purely by reference to 
the decision that laid it down. The authority of the law is simply the 
authority of particular decisions in the form of such rules, and the law is a 
patchwork of distinct, self-contained rules,59 with gaps where no rule is 
applicable.  
Under the interpretative method, individual decisions are taken to be 
generally sound, but it is really the common law as a whole that is 
authoritative, for two reasons.60 First, common law rules are constructed 
from a body of decisions taken together, rather than by adding together 
rules laid down separately in different decisions. Secondly, even if there 
may be little reason to defer to an exercise of moral judgment by a single 
previous court, there is good reason to defer to what is in effect the 
accumulated wisdom of the common law built up over many decisions, in 
which many different judges have considered and reaffirmed the rules 
previously formulated, or modified or replaced them. Thus one can say, in 
short, that the cases of the common law constitute, or are taken to 
constitute, a collective authority with respect to justice.  
Under the interpretative method a court’s decision cannot be 
understood simply as the exercise of a power to make a new authoritative 
rule. A decision makes an incremental contribution to the collective 
authority of the case law. To determine the ratio of an earlier case, a court 
has to determine for itself what rule best accounts for the case, as part of an 
account of a wider body of law. A court might well attribute a ratio to an 
earlier decision that is at odds with the understanding of the court that made 
it,61 and the standing and significance of a decision depend on the support it 
has received from later courts and how it has been interpreted. 
                                                          
58
  AL, 183-4.  
59
  Hence the importance attributed to the ‘individuation’ of rules: see Joseph 
Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’ (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 
823; cf TRS 74-77. 
60
  The common law has indeed sometimes been described as a system of 
collective law-making. See e.g., Gerald J Postema, Bentham and the 
Common Law Tradition (1986) 66-69. On the view taken here, integrity in 
adjudication amounts to collective authority. Dworkin does indeed say that 
the interpretative method is based on a principle of fidelity to past decisions 
or past practices: Dworkin, JR, Ch 5. Constructing the law on the basis of 
consistency with a body of decisions on the facts also allows for ‘theoretical 
ascent’: JR 25, 53. I have not discussed this here.  
61
  On Raz’s approach one can say that in laying down a rule the court 
determines definitively what the material facts of the case are, whereas on 
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According to Raz, it is a necessary feature of a moral authority that 
its directives are capable of being understood and applied without the 
exercise of moral judgement: an authority cannot provide guidance if 
instead it refers the subject back to the moral questions that its guidance is 
supposed to resolve.62 This is the basis for inferring the exclusionary rules 
analysis and the sources thesis from the authoritative nature of the law. The 
implication is that the common law cannot properly be said to be 
authoritative in the way suggested, that is to say by way of the interpretative 
method, because the interpretative method involves the exercise of moral 
judgement. But there seems no reason in principle why a subject cannot be 
guided towards a sound moral conclusion by a method of reasoning that 
imposes constraints on the way that moral judgement can be exercised, 
without altogether excluding it.63 If it is reasonable to think that the 
interpretative method is a sound method of providing guidance as to what is 
just, the common law can reasonably be described as a collective authority 
in the way suggested, and this is consistent with the service conception and 
the NJT.64 It is also consistent with the pre-emption thesis, at least in the 
sense that moral considerations are excluded except insofar as they are 
drawn on by way of the interpretative method. But the interpretative method 
is not consistent with the sources thesis, since it involves the exercise of 
moral judgement. The interpretative method recognises a middle way 
distinct from the two positions recognised under the exclusionary rules 
                                                                                                                                       
the interpretative approach it is always a matter for the later court to decide 
for itself what the material facts of an earlier decision were. For criticism of 
the former approach, see, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how Statutes 
are to be Construed’ (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395; William Twining 
& David Miers, How to Do Things with Rules (4th ed, 1999) 333; Duxbury, 
above n 23, 67-90.  
62
  See above at n 5. See also J Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ above n 56, 
295-6, criticising Dworkin's approach on this ground.  
63
  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Legislators’ Intention and Unintentional Legislation’ 
in Andrei Marmor (ed), Law and Interpretation (1995).  
64
  Dworkin is at pains to deny this, as part of his rejection of Raz’s theory of 
authority: see JR, Ch 7. Similarly, Raz denies that Dworkin’s theory of 
interpretation is compatible with his service conception: EPD, 225-6. If 
analogical reasoning can be used in gap-filling to make law in a more 
predictable fashion, it surely also generally helps the courts to make just 
decisions, by drawing on previous decisions that, since they involve the 
application of a presumptively sound rule, are presumptively sound on their 
facts.  
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analysis:65 the courts neither follow authority without moral judgement, nor 
do they exercise moral judgement to make new law free of authority.66 
The argument does not establish that the interpretative method is 
actually a sound method of determining the justice of a case, or of 
generating a body of rules. One might say, however, that, just as under the 
exclusionary rules analysis the common law’s claim of moral authority 
implies a claim of the competence of the courts at laying down exclusionary 
rules, so under the interpretative method the common law’s claim of moral 
authority implies a claim that courts are competent to make just decisions 
on the facts, and that the method of reasoning from these decisions – in the 
nature of the reflective equilibrium method – is reliable. If the interpretative 
method is superior, it is because courts are better at constructing a just body 
of rules by drawing on many decisions taken together in this way than by 
the accumulation of rules laid down separately. 
Doing justice in adjudication  
As discussed above, a fundamental problem with the exclusionary rules 
analysis of the common law is that it fails to account for the fact that the 
courts do justice at the same time as they make new law. Under the 
exclusionary rules analysis, an authority can ‘make a difference’, creating 
duties that differ from the pre-existing moral duties, by introducing 
conventions to solve co-ordination problems, and by drawing on specialist 
knowledge beyond what can be attributed to ordinary subjects of the law. It 
can introduce what was described above as a new regulatory regime. This is 
clearly an important function of the law, but if a court creates a new duty in 
adjudication, it is liable to act unjustly by holding a party to the new duty 
retroactively.67 If it is to do justice in adjudication, it seems that a court 
should first adjudicate and then separately lay down a new rule to apply 
prospectively, but this is not what courts actually do.  
Furthermore, under the exclusionary rules analysis, even if a court 
lays down a rule that does justice and does not make a difference on the 
facts, there is a problem that the rule may not be apt in other circumstances 
that fall under the rule but were not under consideration in the case, and the 
rule may retroactively impose a new duty in those circumstances. This 
could cause injustice with respect to future or pending disputes over events 
that have already occurred. In practice, the problem is avoided by 
                                                          
65
  On whether there is such a middle way, see Kennedy, above n 28. 
66
  They are not ‘deputy legislators’, as Dworkin put it: TRS, 82. 
67
  This objection really applies with respect to later cases as well, if it is 
unreasonable to think that the new rule has been effectively promulgated. 
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distinguishing, but it is doubtful whether this can be accommodated by the 
exclusionary rules analysis. 
Under the interpretative method, the court does not lay down 
exclusionary rules that can impose a new duty retroactively. The 
interpretative method is a method by which a court draws on previous 
decisions in constructing rules to do justice according to the law on the facts 
of the case before it, which has developed in a system whose primary 
function is adjudication.68 A court always does justice on the facts or 
purports to do so, whether it applies a rule previously announced, or 
formulates a new rule. It follows that under the interpretative method a 
court does not introduce new conventions, or decide cases on the basis of 
specialist knowledge that a legislature might draw on but ordinary subjects 
cannot reasonably be expected to take into account. It does not introduce 
new regulatory regimes in adjudication, which could create new duties and 
apply them retroactively. In my view, this is how we should understand the 
exclusion from adjudication of considerations of policy, as Dworkin 
expresses it.69 It is, of course, open to the legislature to change the law in 
this way, and the legislature’s new rules will take effect prospectively.70 
Also, because the rules laid down in adjudication are provisional, a court 
cannot lay down a rule that, although it does justice on the facts of the case, 
applies in different circumstances where it is not apt and retroactively 
imposes a new duty, since in such circumstances the interpretative method 
allows for the rule to be modified by distinguishing the case. 
If, under the interpretative method, the courts always aim to 
adjudicate by doing justice according to the existing law, it might appear to 
follow that they cannot make law and that under the interpretative method 
the law cannot develop. But in fact the courts do make law, in a limited 
way, under the interpretative method. They make law as they declare it, 
exercising moral judgement in the construction of rules consistent with 
previous decisions taken together. Because the courts make law by doing 
                                                          
68
  Some writers, including Perry, characterise Dworkin’s approach as 
‘adjudicativist’: see eg ‘Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty, and Legal 
Theory’ above n 52, 958. On Raz’s view, characterising the law in terms of 
adjudication or equating it with considerations relevant to adjudication 
reflects an arbitrary preference for the lawyer’s or judge’s perspective: Raz, 
EPD, 199-203. The suggested approach is adjudicativist in the sense that the 
outcomes of cases are taken to have a special significance, but it does not 
imply that the law guides only courts and not subjects; it guides both in the 
sense of the interpretative method.  
69
  For Dworkin’s distinction between policy and principle, see TRS, 82-100.  
70
  Though the courts can identify and endorse conventions that have become 
established in practice and custom, which people already have a moral duty 
to follow. 
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justice on the facts in adjudication, they develop the law not by drawing on 
specialist knowledge that ordinary subjects cannot be expected to take 
account of, or by laying down new conventions, but instead by developing 
the law’s conception of what justice requires from the standpoint of the 
ordinary subject, that is to say, in the light of what, as things stand, ordinary 
subjects can be taken to know and be capable of doing. This is how the 
requirement to make law in accordance with principle as opposed to policy 
should be understood.71 
One might object that, when the law develops in this way, a decision 
can affect the determination of the law with respect to events that have 
already occurred, and this is retroactive legislation, however it is 
presented.72 But this is not the right way to understand the operation of the 
interpretative method. A decision represents the court’s determination of a 
just outcome on the facts. For a later court, this decision makes a 
contribution to the later court’s determination of a just outcome on the facts 
of case before it, by way of the construction of rules under the interpretative 
method. Thus it would be better to say (as discussed further in the next 
section) that a decision can give a later court a different understanding of 
the law by providing new evidence of the law, and it can be evidence of the 
position before the decision is made without amounting to retroactive 
legislation. One can observe a development in the law over time, but this is 
the consequence of the exercise of moral judgement in establishing the 
subsisting law in accordance with the interpretative method, not to make a 
change in the law that can be applied retroactively. 
According to the argument above, the interpretative method is the 
appropriate way for the courts to determine the law in adjudication and to 
develop it through adjudication. But one might reasonably ask why a court, 
having adjudicated, should not also be able to legislate separately for the 
future, so that it could introduce new regulatory regimes, with prospective 
effect, like a legislature. By creating new rights and duties, on the basis of 
an understanding of how people’s behaviour can affect others and how it 
can be co-ordinated for the good of individuals and the community, a 
regulatory regime can achieve what is beyond individual subjects acting 
                                                          
71
  See, in particular, Ronald Dworkin, ‘A Reply by Ronald Dworkin’ in 
Marshall Cohen (ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence 
(1984) 263-68.  
72
  See Kenneth J Kress, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s 
Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions’ (1984) 72 
California Law Review 369, 388. See also Susan Hurley, ‘Coherence, 
Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 221; Alexander & Kress, ‘Against Legal Principles’ above n 25, 
755-61. 
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appropriately in the light of what they understand and are capable of doing 
in the circumstances they are in. It seems that the common law falls short of 
what it could be if the courts were able to do this. One problem is that 
judges are not in a position to carry out the empirical studies or set up the 
administrative systems that may be required to devise and implement sound 
regulatory regimes. This goes to whether they satisfy the NJT with respect 
to their authority to create a new regulatory regime. More generally, the 
objection may be that, even where judges are in a position to improve the 
law in this way, because of the absence of democratic accountability their 
authority to make law should not extend beyond what is incidental to 
adjudication.73  
The declaratory theory and the common law as a 
theoretical authority 
The exclusionary rules analysis represents the positivist tradition in the 
common law. It equates the law with the rules laid down by the courts, to be 
interpreted without the exercise of moral judgement. There is an older 
tradition in the common law, the classical or declaratory theory of the 
common law.74 The interpretative method is in this tradition. It equates the 
law with justice rather than with the rules of the common law. A court 
determines what is just on the facts, and in doing so it draws on previous 
decisions in accordance with the interpretative method by treating them as 
authoritative with respect to the justice of the outcome on the facts, and 
accordingly the rules of the common law are provisional and subject to 
revision in the exercise of the court’s moral judgement.  
The declaratory theory has sometimes been dismissed out of hand.75 
One reason may be that it is thought to be incapable of accounting for the 
role of previous decisions as precedents, but the interpretative method does 
provide such an account. Another reason may be that it attributes an 
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  TRS, 81-91. 
74
  For discussion of the two traditions, see Gerald J Postema, ‘Some Roots of 
our Notion of Precedent’ in Goldstein, above n 48; Peter Wesley-Smith, 
‘Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis’ in Goldstein, ibid; 
Jim Evans, ‘Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth 
Century’ in Goldstein, ibid. See also Mark D Waters, ‘Legal Humanism and 
Law-as-Integrity’ (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal 352; Sean Coyle, 
‘Positivism, Idealism and the Rule of Law’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 257.  
75
  The declaratory theory was dismissed by Lord Reid as a ‘fairy tale’ in ‘The 
Judge as Law Maker’ (1972-3) Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of 
Law (NS) 22 and by Austin as a ‘childish fiction’ (see Hurd, above n 18, 
947). See also Kleinwort Benson, above n 19, 377, per Lord Goff.  
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objective status to moral propositions, but in this respect one cannot 
distinguish between the two approaches considered above. The issue 
between them is not whether the law can make a valid claim of moral 
authority,76 but what form of moral authority the law lays claim to, and one 
can distinguish between the forms of authority claimed by the common law 
under the two approaches in the following way.77 
There is a distinction between a practical authority and an epistemic 
or theoretical authority, which for ordinary purposes is often expressed as 
follows. A practical authority provides guidance, as for example where a 
commanding officer gives orders to his soldiers. If the officer is an 
authority, the soldiers have reason to shoot when ordered to do so. By 
contrast, an epistemic or theoretical authority makes descriptive 
pronouncements, for example a weather forecast, which provides grounds 
for belief rather than guidance. If the forecaster is an authority, someone 
who hears the forecast has reason to believe that the weather will be as 
forecast. But there can be theoretical authorities with respect to morality 
and justice and such an authority can, like a practical authority, provide 
guidance about how to act.78 The difference is that a theoretical authority 
clarifies or reveals the duty the subject S already has, whereas a practical 
authority can give S a new duty, a duty he acquires by virtue of the directive 
issued by the practical authority. 
A theoretical authority on moral questions has authority by virtue of 
its superior understanding of morality or justice. In other respects, that is to 
say with respect to the circumstances that S is in and how S’s behaviour 
may affect others, the authority has the same understanding of the position 
as S. In this sense, it operates as if from S’s standpoint. By contrast, the 
basis for practical authority is not only the authority’s superior 
understanding of morality or justice, but also its superior scientific and 
technical knowledge concerning the consequences of S’s behaviour and the 
behaviour of others, and how they might be co-ordinated, and also its status 
as a de facto authority, by virtue of which it can lay down new conventions. 
This is why a practical authority can give S a new duty. One might say that 
the difference between a practical authority and a theoretical authority is a 
matter of standpoint, the theoretical authority adopting S’s standpoint and 
the practical authority a more elevated standpoint.  
                                                          
76
  See above, n 14. 
77
  As to theoretical and practical authority, see, for example, Revisiting the 
Service Conception, 1032-37; Hurd, above n 57, 1615-20. Raz’s service 
conception is a general analysis of authority, applicable to both theoretical 
and practical authorities. 
78
  As noted above at n 14, this is presupposed by the service conception 
approach to practical authority.  
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The law is generally understood to be a practical authority, and it 
seems clear that a legislature is a practical authority, or at least is capable of 
acting as a practical authority and creating a new regulatory regime. A 
court’s first or original function is adjudication, finding and applying the 
law on the facts of the case. An adjudicator may act as a practical authority 
over the parties to the dispute when it issues orders, but it is, in the first 
place, a theoretical authority with respect to the law. Insofar as it exercises 
moral judgement in adjudication, it also is, or purports to be, a theoretical 
authority with respect to justice in the circumstances of the case. It purports 
to do justice as between the parties in their particular circumstances, and it 
considers the position from their standpoint, in the sense that its authority 
lies only in its superior understanding of what justice according to the law 
requires of them in the circumstances, and not special knowledge about the 
circumstances or the ability to lay down conventions. With respect to the 
adjudication, the court’s authority is over the parties, but through the 
adjudication the court can also make law or contribute to making law 
through the effect of its decision under the interpretative method. In this 
way, it acts as an authority for subjects of the law in general and not just the 
parties, but it is still a theoretical authority, not a practical authority like a 
legislature. In accordance with the interpretative method, previous decisions 
operate collectively as a theoretical authority with respect to justice.79 By 
contrast, under the exclusionary rules analysis of the common law, the 
common law is, or purports to be, like the legislature, a practical authority. 
Insofar as they make law in adjudication, the courts adopt the legislative 
                                                          
79
  Cf above n 48, for the analogy to reasoning with respect to scientific 
theories. Various writers have suggested that the law is in general a 
theoretical authority, though not in the way suggested, which is confined to 
the common law. See Hurd, above n 57. See also Regan, above n 50. One 
might object that if the common law is based, in the end, on the theoretical 
authority of the courts to determine what is just on the facts, based on their 
expertise, and not on the de facto authority required to introduce new 
conventions, the judges are in no different a position from other types of 
expert, such as legal academics or legal practitioners, and the suggested 
analysis does not explain why it is justified for courts to treat previous 
decisions of the courts as authoritative but not the opinions of academics or 
practitioners. This argument is made against Raz’s service conception as a 
comprehensive analysis of political authority: see Stephen Perry, ‘Two 
Problems of Political Authority’ (2007) 6 American Philological 
Association Newsletters 31; and see Raz, Revisiting the Service Conception, 
1032-37, discussing the ‘qualification problem’. For present purposes, the 
point is that it is the application of the court’s expertise to a particular set of 
facts in the particular context of adjudication, with all the procedural 
requirements governing its exercise of judgement, and not the ability of 
judges to expound the law, as an academic or practitioner might do, that 
makes the decision – the outcome on the facts – authoritative.  
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standpoint rather than the standpoint of the legal subject. This is inapt for an 
authority making law through adjudication, and this is the source of the 
problems that the exclusionary rules analysis has in explaining the common 
law. 
V. Summary 
The analysis of the common law as a body of exclusionary rules laid down 
by an authority is intuitively appealing and widely accepted, and appears to 
derive strong support from Raz’s theory of authority. However, the analysis 
implies that there are gaps in the common law, where the courts act without 
any constraint by authority, and where they may adjudicate by way of 
retroactive legislation as a matter of course, and this is both contrary to the 
conventional understanding of legal reasoning in the common law and open 
to objection in principle. It is also difficult to reconcile with the distinctive 
common law reasoning techniques of distinguishing, overruling, identifying 
the ratio or holding of a case, and arguing by way of analogical reasoning. 
On the alternative approach suggested above, a common law court 
should be understood not as having authority to apply or lay down 
exclusionary rules, but as having authority to determine a just outcome on 
the facts of the case. On this basis, one can say that the common law as a 
whole is a collective theoretical authority with respect to justice, and in this 
sense its authority is consistent with the service conception and the NJT, 
though not the sources thesis. The approach supports a version of 
Dworkin’s theory of interpretation with respect to the common law. It 
explains how it is that common law courts are always guided by authority, 
and yet at the same time always do justice on the facts without retroactive 
legislation. It also shows that the courts do not lay down definitive 
exclusionary rules, but provisional rules in the sense explained, which later 
courts can modify by distinguishing an earlier decision; that these rules are 
developed through analogical reasoning and interpretation; that the common 
law has to be understood holistically, not as a patchwork of self-contained 
rules, and that it cannot be reduced to or equated with a body of rules; that 
there is no strict division in legal reasoning between matters of authority or 
precedent and matters of analogical reasoning and interpretation involving 
the exercise of moral judgement; that determining the ratio of a case is not 
simply a matter of ascertaining the rule that the court intended to lay down, 
but is a matter for subsequent interpretation and depends on other cases; and 
that common law courts do not legislate in the way that a legislature does, 
though they do make law in a more limited way: in the sense explained 
above, they make law in accordance with principle and not policy. 
